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LABOR LAW-THE SUBSTANCE OF PROCEDURE: DEFINING
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
IN INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION OF CONTINENTAL PILOTS v.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
I. INTRODUCTION
The airline industry is a national asset, depended upon by individuals
and industry in much the same manner as railroads were relied upon in
the early Twentieth Century.1 Despite its national importance, the preca-
rious financial state of the airline industry is a threat to its survival. 2 One
factor underlying airlines' financial malaise is the historically tenuous, and
often antagonistic, relationship between airlines' management and the in-
dustry's unions.3
1. See Roberto L. Corrada, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 923-24 (1998) (discussing importance of certain wartime
industries and Congress' motive in protecting them through legislation); Kathe-
rine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor Act in the Era
of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1485, 1489-90 (1990) (reviewing relationship be-
tween airline industry and nation's economy); Mark A. Schuler, Note, The Railway
Labor Act of 1926 and Modern-Day Airline Labor Strife: Progress Toward Labor Peace
Begins with Overruling Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 189,
189-93 (1997) (comparing railroad industry to today's airline industry).
2. See Francis Grab, "Share the Pain, Share the Gain": Airline Bankruptcies and the
Railway Labor Act, 24 TANsp. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996) (discussing economic problems of
airlines and Americans' perceptions of "precarious condition of the industry"); Mi-
chele M. Jochner, Note, The Detrimental Effects of Hostile Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts,
and Excessive Debt on the Airline Industry, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 219, 220-21 (1990) (discuss-
ing threat that increased debt poses to airline industry); see also Continental Lawsuit
has Billion Dollar Potentia4 33(7) BANKR. COURT. 1, IA (Nov. 10, 1998) (discussing
Continental's economic viability); Bill Poling, Senate Subcommittee Ponders Decreasing
Number of Airlines, TRAVEL WKLY., Mar. 5, 1992, at 7 (discussing Senate's review of
problem of decreasing number of airlines). For a further discussion of the
problems airline bankruptcies present in lieu of labor laws, see infra note 110.
3. See Grab, supra note 2, at 24 (positing that "enmity between labor and man-
agement interests poses a serious threat to the continued vitality of the airline
industry"); John V. Jansonius & Kenneth E. Broughten, Coping with Deregulation:
Reduction of Labor Costs in the Airline Industy, 49J. AIR L. & CoM. 501, 501-03 (1984)
(noting that, because of deregulation of airline industry, relations between man-
agement and labor unions have not been stable); Ann Merrill, Labor Turmoil: The
Battle for Public Support-Ad Campaigns Take Off as NWA, Pilots Seek Edge, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 21, 1998, at ID (discussing "war" between Northwest
Airlines and its pilots).
The relationship between labor and management in the airline industry was
actually fairly stable from the mid-1930s until the late 1970s. See Stone, supra note
1, at 1489 (noting change in management-labor relationships that occurred during
1970s). At least one author has pointed to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
which allowed a number of new, nonunion airlines to enter the industry, and cited
rising fuel costs as factors that affected relations. See id. (noting impact of deregu-
lation and rising fuel costs on airline industry). Because fuel prices were so in-
flated, airlines needed to purchase more efficient aircraft, which they did by
(895)
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In 1936, Congress recognized the importance of the emerging airline
industry on the national economy, as well as the impact of its labor strife,
by covering the industry under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 4 The RIA
provides for strict regulation of management-labor relations in an effort to
avoid costly strikes. 5 A fundamental piece of the RLA is its emphasis on
dispute resolution, which includes binding arbitration, as a means of
resolving disagreements efficiently.6
Although the RLA provides the framework for labor arbitration,
courts must determine the finer points, such as what is arbitrable and who
has jurisdiction in labor disputes.7 As a consequence, the courts have
been forced to clarify their own role in labor arbitration.8 The court's
role, including whether the court has jurisdiction over a given dispute,
borrowing money at very high interest rates. See id. at 1490. "The result was that
these airlines were saddled with enormous interest charges just as price competi-
tion became fierce." Id. The larger airlines, financially strapped from high inter-
est loans, had difficulty competing with smaller, nonunion airlines. See id. As a
result, airline management attempted to cut nonfuel costs by lowering its labor
costs; in its attempt to lower labor costs, management targeted unions. See id. at
1490-91 (discussing management's reaction to financial problems). "And because
labor costs are a high proportion of their total costs, management went to war
against its unions." Id. at 1490; see Grab, supra note 2, at 8 ("The logical strategy for
airline executives was to go after labor expenses.").
4. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1988)). In 1936 the Act was broadened to include the airline industry. See Grab,
supra note 2, at 8.
5. See Stone, supra note 2, at 1491-92 (discussing impact of RLA on airline
unions' ability to strike and noting that RLA makes strikes absolute last resort).
Although other statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), may
regulate labor-management relations in industry, the RLA is peculiar in that it
designates that collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to its author-
ity do not expire. See id. at 1494-95 (comparing NLRA to RLA). For a further
discussion of the RLA and its provisions and objectives, see infra notes 33-46 and
accompanying text.
6. See Schuler, supra note 1, at 194-95 (reviewing procedural aspects of RLA
and how negotiation, mediation and arbitration are called for in statute).
7. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 920-21 (noting impact courts have had on
arbitration law and development); Stone, supra note 1, at 1504-05 (discussing im-
pact Supreme Court has had on expanding, and narrowing, labor arbitration
under RLA).
8. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S.
299, 301 (1989) (distinguishing between "minor" disputes, that are tnder compul-
sory jurisdiction of arbitrator and "major" disputes, in which courts may inter-
vene); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)
(discussing "threshold question" of who has jurisdiction-courts or arbitrator);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)
(discussing role of courts in labor disputes); Elgin, J.E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 722-28 (1945) (discussing role of courts and arbitrators in settling labor dis-
putes under RLA); see also Corrada, supra note 1, at 927-28 (discussing history of
labor arbitration under statutory law and process of developing "what judicial con-
trols should govern it"); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 471 (1998) (noting that "judi-
cial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited"); Gerald F. Rath & Richelle S.
Kennedy, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 1062 PLI/CoRp. 513, 515 (July-Aug.
896 [Vol. 44: p. 895
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may turn on two important distinctions: (1) whether the underlying dis-
pute constitutes a "major" or "minor" issue and (2)whether the question
before the court relates to "procedural arbitrability" or "substantive arbi-
trability."9 Although it is firmly established that major disputes and issues
of substantive arbitrability warrant judicial authority and minor disputes
and questions concerning procedural arbitrability do not, the outcome of
disputes often turns on the interpretation of these rules and definitions of
"major/minor" and "procedural/substantive arbitrability."10
For example, such was the issue in Independent Ass'n of Continental Pi-
lots v. Continental Airlines.II There, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit distinguished between the categories of "major" and "mi-
nor" and delineated the characteristics of procedural versus substantive
arbitrability in labor disputes. 12 In addition, the court analyzed how the
two categories fit together under the RLA and ultimately affect the court's
role in labor arbitration.
13
This Casebrief discusses the development of the law in the Third Cir-
cuit concerning federal judicial authority and the role of the arbitrator in
labor disputes.14 Part II of this Casebrief provides a historical overview of
labor arbitration, including the legislative history and policy behind labor
arbitration, the RLA and pertinent Supreme Court decisions. 15 Part II
1998) (stating that narrowjudicial review of arbitration awards maintains goal of
"preserv[ing] the efficiency and economy of the arbitration process").
9. See John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 556 (noting difference between procedural and
substantive arbitrability); Schuler, supra note 1, at 193-94 (noting distinction be-
tween major and minor disputes under RLA); Stone, supra note 1, at 1500-09 (dis-
cussing major-minor dichotomy); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 1502-09 (reviewing
how characterization affects whether courts have jurisdiction over given dispute).
10. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1505 (noting impact characterization of dispute
can have on forum and eventual outcome).
11. 155 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1998).
12. See id. at 692 (discussing issues on appeal, which included not only deter-
mination of whether dispute was minor or major, but whether it involved question
of substantive or procedural arbitrability).
13. See id. at 692-97 (reviewing overall framework for analyzing labor disputes
within, and between, two categories).
14. For a further discussion of Third Circuit case law concerning the issue of
the court's role in labor arbitration and how that determination is made, see infra
notes 88-161 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the historical background of labor arbitration,
see infra notes 19-108 and accompanying text. Although issues relating to arbitra-
tion of employment discrimination and preemption under the RLA and similar
statutes are closely tied, this Casebrief is narrowly focused on the issue of major/
minor disputes and substantive/procedural arbitration. For a discussion of em-
ployment discrimination and arbitration, see Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between
Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Pro-
posed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 688-89 (1997) (discussing differences between
collective bargaining and individual employment rights and how two models are
interpreted under current law); see generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-
War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1516 (1981) (discussing
collective bargaining and arbitration of disputes).
19991
3
Tyson: Labor Law - The Substance of Procedure: Defining Judicial Authori
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
also examines the broader context of federal circuit courts' decisions in
this area to provide context for the Third Circuit case law establishing and
defining judicial authority in labor arbitration cases. 16 Part III discusses
the facts of Continental Airlines and reviews the Third Circuit's analysis of
major/minor disputes and procedural versus substantive arbitrability. 17
Part IV analyzes the court's decision in the context of the airline industry
and comments on potential problems the Third Circuit's decision
presents to the creation of collective bargaining agreements. 18
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE EMERGENCE OF LABOR ARBITRATION
Labor arbitration has become an important means of dispute resolu-
tion over the past century.1 9 To fully understand the impact a given fo-
rum may have on the parties to a dispute-as well as the outcome of a
disagreement-it is important to consider the policy reasons behind labor
arbitration. 20 Furthermore, complete comprehension of this area re-
quires examination of statutes enacted to govern arbitration as well as
Supreme Court decisions that have clarified and impacted this area of la-
bor law. 2
1
A. Concerns for Stability and Efficiency Underlie the
Emphasis on Labor Arbitration
There have been a number of proposed policy rationales behind la-
bor arbitration. 22 As the labor movement grew in the earlier part of the
16. For a further discussion of the facts, issue and analysis of Continental Air-
lines, see infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Continental Air-
lines, see infra notes 123-53 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Continental Air-
lines and its impact on labor law and labor law practitioners, see infra notes 154-66
and accompanying text.
19. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR 11 OHIo ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 241, 243 (1996) (noting that during
last twenty-five years, "many have posited a need to develop approaches to resolv-
ing disputes that avoid full traditional litigation").
20. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1501-02 (discussing characterization of disputes
and possible effects of characterization on outcomes).
21. See id. at 1504-10 (reviewing impact judicial decisions can have on statu-
tory interpretation and arguing that courts sometimes distort original intent of
such statutes as RLA); see Schuler, supra note 1, at 190 (noting interaction between
statutory law and judicial interpretation in labor arbitration).
22. See Bales, supra note 15, at 745-48 (discussing emergence of arbitration in
context of labor movement and noting that arbitration "completed the metaphor
of industrial organization as a self-contained mini-democracy"); Corrada, supra
note 1, at 920 (positing that concerns for efficiency may be possible explanation
for growth of labor arbitration as means of dispute resolution); Stone, supra note
1, at 1494 (noting arbitration's use in RLA as effort to avoid industrial strife and
give workers voice in management of industry); Schuler, supra note 1, at 192 (dis-
cussing reasons that arbitration is favored in railroad industry due to policy con-
cerns about stability and security).
[Vol. 44: p. 895898
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Twentieth Century, the emphasis on efficient dispute resolution also in-
creased.23 As a result of two world wars and an increasing dependence on
industrialization, stability in the workplace became a paramount objec-
tive. 24 With respect to the railroad industry, the need for stability was even
greater. 25 Railroads were the prime method of transport, and labor strife
threatened not only the expediency and ability of the railroads to this end,
but also threatened national security during a time of international
unrest.26
One commentator has characterized the growth of arbitration and alternative
methods of dispute resolution as an effort in privatization. See Weinstein, supra
note 19, at 243-44 (discussing emergence of arbitration in all facets of U.S. law).
This author notes a number of concerns that factor into arbitration's popularity.
See id. at 243. These concerns include:
(1) anxiety over so-called "litigation explosion" that some say is clogging
our courts; (2) a general sense that even though there are too many law-
yers and too much law, the average person and many commercial enter-
prises are left out of the system and cannot get help at a reasonable cost
when and how it is needed; (3) a consensus that traditional court
processes often unnecessarily exacerbate hostility; and (4) proliferation
of new types of litigation such as many types of discrimination cases and
mass tort class actions often involving hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs,
multiple defendants, and difficult problems of science.
Id. The author also notes that use of arbitration is pervasive and not limited to
"statutorily mandated relationships," such as those that exist between labor and
management. See id. at 243-45 (reviewing legal areas in which arbitration has been
incorporated).
23. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 921 (noting link between labor movement
and arbitration as favored method of dispute resolution).
24. See id. at 922 (noting "need to curtail the number of strikes in this country
in the immediate post-war period").
25. See id. at 926-28 (discussing reasons why unions are open to arbitration
despite negative impact on them). The author points out that arbitration is, in
many ways, adverse to labor unions. See id. at 926 (remarking that openness with
which unions embraced arbitration was unexpected given that arbitration is often
adverse to union interests). For example, the use of arbitration gives up some of
the strike power unions relied on in the past as a means of ensuring the collective
bargaining process. See id. By agreeing to mandatory arbitration, unions lose a
degree of their strike power, which is a major motivator for management to resolve
disputes quickly. See id. In addition, arbitration may have placed the emphasis on
individual, rather than class, consciousness, so important to the union movement.
See id. at 926 (noting emphasis on "particularized workplace politics" within more
recent labor movement). Finally, arbitration may have furthered the interests of
management while reducing transcribed constitutional rights into contract lan-
guage. See id.
26. See Schuler, supra note 1, at 191-92 (discussing historical perspective of
railroad unrest). The railroads were vital to this nation throughout the first half of
this century. See id. at 192. During World War I, the railroad industry exper-
ienced a great deal of labor unrest and shortages. See id. (noting "transportation
crisis" of World War I). The government realized that labor strife in the railroad
industry threatened not only the nation's economy, but national security as well.
See id. (discussing implications of labor strife); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 1498
(noting potential impact of railroad strife on nation's ability to handle interna-
tional conflict).
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Although these may have been the reasons for arbitration's initial
growth, a desire for efficiency has heightened labor arbitration's attractive-
ness. 27 From the unions' perspective, a long history of judicial hostility
towards the labor movement may explain their willingness to embrace this
alternative dispute forum. 28 For employers, the efficiency interest may be
one of lower legal costs. 29 Arbitration provides an alternative to litigation,
which ultimately means less money spent on legal fees. 30 Finally, arbitra-
tion means efficiency for the courts.3 1 Labor arbitration provides a lower
cost alternative to judicial litigation as well as a shift in costs from the pub-
lic to the private sector32
27. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 921 (describing need for efficiency as predic-
tive of "explosive growth for arbitration").
28. See id. at 926 (noting that arbitration goes against unions' interests). One
commentator has characterized unions' acceptance of arbitration as surprising
given the fact that a unions' strength lies in its ability to strike. See id. The courts'
historical antagonism towards the labor movement may have been one factor con-
tributing to unions' acceptance of arbitration. See id. at 927. Another factor may
have been the national concern over labor stability and industrial peace. See id. at
927-28. Regardless of the reasons, by agreeing to arbitration, the unions have abdi-
cated a degree of bargaining power. See id. at 926 (relating consequences of arbi-
tration on unions); Stone, supra note 1, at 1498-1500 (noting impact of RLA on
labor unions).
29. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 925-27 (delineating reasons why employers
may embrace arbitration over litigation in labor disputes).
30. See id. (reviewing reasons why employers are willing to embrace
arbitration).
31. See id. at 928 (noting that arbitration can act as "filter" for courts). But see
Weinstein, supra note 19, at 261-62 (discussing risks associated with ADR and possi-
bility that "two-tiered" system will be created). Although arbitration may present a
viable, and even preferable, alternative to litigation, some critics warn that too
much reliance on ADR may have a negative effect because ADR places judicial
authority in private hands. See id. at 261-62 (predicting that in future only rich
litigants will have access to ADR while poor will be relegated to underfunded pub-
lic courts).
In the labor context, arbitration is generally viewed as a positive alternative to
litigation and/or strikes. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 919-21 (discussing benefits
of arbitration to labor movement). Arbitration, as it is delineated in statutes such
as the RLA and NLRA, increases industrial democracy and allows workers a greater
say in workplace decisions. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1500-04 (discussing how
arbitration should be conducted in theory under RLA and NLRA). This happens
because the statutes create "mini-democracies" whereby union members contract
with management, creating their own terms concerning what can be disputed and
how or when it can be challenged. See id. at 1499 (noting intent of statute proce-
dure); see also Bales, supra note 15, at 745-48 (noting that collective bargaining
provides parties with insulation from outside interference). One commentator has
warned, however, that the courts' interpretations of statutory language have
eroded the equalizing intent behind the legislation. See Stone, supra note 1, at
1499-1506 (positing that courts are expanding management's authority and discre-
tion under RLA by their interpretation of statutory language and Supreme Court
precedent). Thus, courts are defining their own jurisdiction more narrowly, to the
detriment of the unions. See id. at 1510 (noting that unions are losing protection
under RLA as courts employ broad interpretation of statute's language).
32. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 928 & n.51 (discussing reasons why courts
have so readily embraced arbitration).
[Vol. 44: p. 895
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B. Legislation Provides the Basis for Labor Arbitration:
The Railway Labor Act
Congress has been actively involved with the labor movement and,
consequently, with the development of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution in labor conflicts.33 For example, in 1926, Congress passed the
RLA.34 The RLA was intended to deal with conflicts arising between rail-
road workers and the industry's management in an effort to protect na-
tional security, to end disputes quickly and to avoid costly strikes.3 5 In
1936, the RLA was extended to apply to the airline industry.36 It was
hoped that the RLA, with its mandatory arbitration protocol, would help
create stability in the airline industry and lessen the economic effects of
labor disputes.3 7 One distinguishing feature of the RLA is that collective
bargaining agreements, formed pursuant to its provisions, do not expire. 38
These agreements remain in force until one party proposes a change, and
then, even if a portion of the agreement is changed, the remainder is as-
sumed to stand.3 9
The RLA as amended includes the following two stated policy objec-
tives: (1) "to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;" and (2) "to provide
for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."4 0 These two policy objectives
33. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); National La-
bor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; see also Corrada, supra note 1, at 919-20 (reviewing federal
statutes dealing with labor regulation).
34. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994).
35. See Schuler, supra note 1, at 192 (delineating reasons legislature passed
RLA).
36. See id. at 192 n.23 (recognizing that RLA was amended to include airline
industry in 1936).
37. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1494-98 (noting intent of RLA).
38. See id. (discussing differences between RLA and other labor-regulating
statutes). Two of the RLA's provisions protecting the status quo and ensuring that
the collective bargaining agreement does not expire have been recently eroded.
See id. at 1492 (noting that original intent of RLA has been changed as applied to
airline industry). Although "piecemeal" changes were the practice in the railroad
industry, in the airline industry another practice has emerged. See id. at 1496 (dis-
cussing how agreements under RLA never expire). Airline industry collective bar-
gaining agreements often incorporate a clause waiving the right to amend the
agreement until a specified date, at which time either or both parties may seek to
amend the agreement in accordance with the statute. See id. Thus, these waivers
give collective bargaining agreements in the airline industry the appearance of
having an end date, but in reality they never expire. See id. (noting that courts
have upheld these "amendable date" clauses).
39. See id. at 1494-98 (discussing general provisions of RLA).
40. Grab, supra note 2, at 8-9 (citing Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C.§ 151 (1988)).
1999]
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have given rise to the distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes.4 1
The difference is that a major dispute involves a party seeking to change a
substantive term of the collective bargaining agreement. 42 Thus, a major
dispute is subject to the continuance of the status quo, that is, the terms of
the current agreement, until the dispute can be settled.43 Settling a major
dispute involves a purposefully lengthy process that includes negotiation,
mediation, judicial intervention and ultimately may result in a strike. 44 A
minor dispute, on the other hand, focuses on the interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.45 Also, a minor dispute is sub-
ject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator whose decision is usually
binding.4
6
C. The Supreme Court's Decisions: The "Steelworkers Trilogy"
Although Congress paved the way for labor arbitration with legisla-
tion that defined the role of unions and management in the growing labor
movement, much of the substance of labor arbitration law has come from
Supreme Court decisions. 4 7 In 1960, the Supreme Court confronted
three labor arbitration cases, which helped define the scope of arbitration
and the role of the courts in the arbitral process. 48 In United Steelworkers of
41. See id. at 9-10 (discussing courts' interpretation of policy objectives); see
also Elgin,J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945) (using terms "major"
and "minor" for first time to distinguish between two types of labor disputes under
RLA). It is important to note that, under the language of the RLA, there are actu-
ally three types of disputes that might occur. See Independent Ass'n of Continental
Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685, 690 (3d Cir. 1998) (naming types of
disputes that can occur). The third type of disagreement, "representation dis-
putes," encompass disputes arising over the selection of collective bargaining rep-
resentatives. See id. (noting that classification of dispute affects to which forum it is
relegated); see also Ronald P. Wilder, Jr. et al., Representation Issues Under the Railway
Labor Act, SC25 ALI-ABA 21, 23 (Oct. 23, 1997) (outlining statutory provisions en-
acted in RLA that pertain to representation issues and disputes).
42. See Grab, supra note 2, at 9-10 (reviewing "major" dispute category).
43. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1498-1500 (discussing "status quo" provisions
and their relevance in major disputes).
44. See Grab, supra note 2, at 9-10 (reviewing procedure for settling major
disputes under RLA). The process is purposefully long and drawn out as a disin-
centive to making illegitimate or frivilous changes. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1499
(noting that settlement of major disputes is lengthy and arduous process).
45. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1501-04 (explaining differences between "ma-
jor" and "minor" disputes).
46. See id. at 1509-12 (noting procedure for settling "minor" disputes). The
procedural/substantive arbitrability analysis did not arise under the RLA. See In-
dependent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685, 692(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that arbitrability distinction comes from NLRA law).
47. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 923-24 (discussing role of Supreme Court in
expanding and defining use of arbitration in labor movement).
48. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960) (discussing deference to arbitrator's decisions); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 576-78 (1960) (discussing which judicial
controls should govern arbitration); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 566-68 (1960) (reviewing substantive/procedural dichotomy). The
[Vol. 44: p. 895
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss5/4
1999] CASEBRIEF 903
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,4 9 the first of these cases, the Court
addressed the role of the arbitrator. 50 In United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.5 1 and United Steelworkers of America v. Ameri-
can Manufacturing Co.,5 2 the Court further defined the "substantive" analy-
sis and emphasized the necessity of determining whether an issue lies
within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.53 These cases are
collectively called the "Steelworkers Trilogy," and together underscore the
Court's position that labor arbitration is a "mechanism to encourage col-
lective bargaining and industrial peace."
54
1. Additional Cases Are Evidence of the Court's Willingness to Give Deference
to Arbitrators' Decisions.
Both before and after the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court
stressed the importance of arbitration in the resolution of labor dis-
putes.5 5 For example, in Elgin, J. & E. Railway Co. v. Burley,56 the Court
first described the major/minor framework. 5 7 The major/minor test is
based on the policy objectives enumerated in the RLA and was formulated
Steelworkers Trilogy cases mark judicial acceptance of labor arbitration as well as
lay out the basis of judicial authority over what cases are arbitrable. See Corrada,
supra note 1, at 928 (discussing Supreme Court's "national policy in favor of labor
arbitration").
49. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
50. See id. at 595 (discussing function of court versus function of arbitrator).
51. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
52. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
53. See id. at 568 (discussing importance of selecting appropriate forum for
dispute settlement).
54. Corrada, supra note 1, at 928. The Steelworkers Trilogy collectively deter-
mined that the function of the courts with respect to arbitration agreements is
limited to:
assuring that the claim is governed by the contract; ordering the parties
to arbitrate unless the arbitration clause "is not susceptible of an interpre-
tation that covers the asserted dispute," and refraining from reviewing the
merits of an award so long as it "draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement."
Bales, supra note 15, at 723 (citations omitted).
55. See Corrada, supra note 1, at 926-27 (discussing historical development of
arbitration); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491
U.S. 299, 310 (1989) (discussing intent of RLA to avoid strikes and that arbitration
aids that goal); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 647 (1986) (denoting importance of labor arbitration); Union Pac. R.R. v.
Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 90 (1978) (same); Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v.
United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 145 (1969) (underscoring role of labor arbi-
tration); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685-86
(1963) (reviewing importance of arbitration to industry).
56. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
57. See Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155
F.3d 685, 690 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court set forth the major/minor
framework in [Burley]."); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 1501 (discussing inception
of major/minor framework).
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to determine which forum, the court or arbitration, was appropriate in a
given dispute. 58
The Court in Burley, however, did not explain how to distinguish be-
tween major and minor disputes. 59 That was accomplished in a later case,
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n.6o There, the Court
noted that what distinguishes a minor dispute is that it can be settled by
the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement. 61 On the other
hand, a major dispute arises when one party tries to change the terms of
an agreement, create a new agreement or where the "employer's claims
are frivolous or obviously insubstantial."62 This last requirement was ad-
ded in an effort to dissuade management from characterizing a dispute as
minor merely by claiming it was their interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.63 The language of such a requirement, however, has
given rise to debate between circuit courts over the meaning of "frivolous"
and over just how reasonable an employer's claimed interpretation must
be.64
Another important Supreme Court labor arbitration case, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,65 developed the "procedural arbitrability" analy-
58. See Elgin,J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 728 (1945) ("The.collec-
tive agent's power to act in the various stages of the statutory procedures is part of
those procedures and necessarily is related to them in function, scope and
purpose.").
59. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 691 ("Although the Burley court estab-
lished the general contours of the distinction between major and minor disputes,
it did not articulate a standard for differentiating the two.").
60. 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
61. See id. at 305 ("The distinguishing feature of such a case is that the dispute
may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing agreement.").
62. Id. at 307.
63. See Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 138 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing Court's require-
ment that employer's interpretation of agreement not be "frivolous"); United
Transp. Union v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 130 F.3d 627, 632 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting that "frivolous" requirement was added to "prevent that party's char-
acterization of the dispute from undercutting the RLA's prohibition against unilat-
eral imposition of contractual terms").
64. SeeStone, supra note 1, at 1507 (noting that, in past, courts' interpretation
of standard put forth by Supreme Court led to numerous differing standards of
how rational employer's interpretation was required to be); see also Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 491 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
that dispute is minor if agreement is "reasonably susceptible" to carrier's asserted
defense); Local 1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir.
1973) (stating that dispute was minor where carrier's interpretation of agreement
was not "obviously insubstantial"); REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Air-
lines & S.S. Clerks, 459 F.2d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that carrier's inter-
pretation had to be "arguable"); IBEW v. Washington Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156,
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting defense must be "arguable"); Airlines Steward &
Stewardesses Ass'n v. Carribbean Ad. Airlines, Inc., 412 F.2d 289, 291-92 (1st Cir.
1969) (using "obviously insubstantial" standard).
65. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
[Vol. 44: p. 895
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sis.6 6 The John Wiley Court laid out the analysis for determining whether a
case contains substantive or procedural issues.67 The Court stated that
substantive issues are those that question whether the parties have even
agreed to arbitrate the disputed matter, whereas procedural issues ques-
tion whether "grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a par-
ticular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or excused,
or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbi-
trate."68 The Court in John Wiley was concerned with the interaction of
procedural and substantive issues that may arise in a labor dispute.6 9 In
response to this concern, the Court defined the role of the arbitrator ver-
sus the court and stated, "[i] t would be a curious rule which required that
intertwined issues of 'substance' and 'procedure' growing out of a single
dispute and raising the same questions on the same facts had to be carved
up between two different forums, one deciding the other."70 Thus, issues
of procedural arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide, but questions
concerning substantive arbitrability are for the courts.7 1
2. Courts: How the Lower Federal Courts Approached the Jurisdictional Issues
in Labor Disputes
The federal circuit courts have also confronted the issues surround-
ing labor dispute arbitration with varying results. 72 Although legislation
and Supreme Court precedent have created a structured framework for
labor arbitration, the finer points of the analysis are often left to the lower
courts to decipher. 73 Several important issues, such as whether the court
or the arbitrator has jurisdiction over a particular dispute, hinge on dis-
tinctions between whether a dispute is deemed "major" or "minor" and of
'substantive" or "procedural" arbitrability.74
66. See id. at 558 (explaining procedural arbitrability analysis). In John Wiley,
the Supreme Court first used the "substantive arbitrability" terminology. See In-
dependent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685, 692-93
(3d Cir. 1998) (discussing John Wiley and its impact on labor law). John Wiley was
actually a case arising under the NLRA. See John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557-58 (using
term "substantive arbitrability").
67. See John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557-58 (discussing difference between cases in-
volving question of substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability).
68. Id. at 557.
69. See id. (noting that certain questions involve consideration of merits and
must go to arbitrator).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 557-58 (noting that determination of scope of arbitration is for
arbitrator where question presented is one of procedural arbitrability).
72. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1507 (discussing fact that courts employed rela-
tively uneven standards until recently when evaluating major versus minor
disputes).
73. See id. (noting that lower courts are left to create own standards under
guidance of Supreme Court and statutory language).
74. See Grab, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing distinctions between categories);
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Although the overall rules are fairly straight forward, until recently,
the courts had not applied consistent standards to determine if a dispute
was "major" or "minor."75 In addition, there is a tendency for courts to
simplify the language of Supreme Court precedent and say that "major"
disputes involve a change or creation of an agreement, while "minor" dis-
putes arise over the interpretation of an agreement. 76 This simplification
has caused parties to plead their issues in a way that will ensure the forum
they prefer. 77 Thus, one side, generally management, might attempt to
frame their case as an interpretive issue, while the other side, usually the
union, will argue that the dispute is over an effort to change the original
agreement.78 Similarly, the way the parties frame the substantive/proce-
dural arbitrability issue may also affect the forum and, ultimately, the
outcome.
79
As a result, nearly all circuit courts apply an "arguably justified" stan-
dard in determining whether a given dispute is major or minor.80 This
standard creates a presumption that the dispute arising under the RLA is a
75. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1507 (discussing courts' inconsistent results).
76. See id. at 1505 (discussing courts' simplification of standard that has made
defining it "elusive").
77. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S.
299, 305 (1989) (noting that "the distinction between major and minor disputes is
a matter of pleading"); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 138 F.3d 635, 639-40 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing
unions' tendency to want dispute classified as "major" so that union can opt to
"strike or picket"); Stone, supra note 1, at 1505-06 (discussing how parties attempt
to characterize disputes based on desired forum).
78. See Atchison, 138 F.3d at 639-40 (noting that railroads generally want dis-
pute classified as minor).
79. See Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155
F.3d 685, 693 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that determination of type of arbitrability will
affect forum); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of Am. v.
Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 104 F.3d 181, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that, although union attempted to frame issue as one of substantive arbitrability,
question presented concerned procedural arbitrability for arbitrator to decide);
Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 1992)
(determining that issues of procedural arbitrability are for arbitrator to decide);
Brotherhood Ry., Carmen Div. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 956 F.2d
156, 159 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing how type of arbitrability determines whether
court or arbitrator has jurisdiction).
80. See Atchison, 138 F.3d at 644 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting that appropri-
ate standard is whether employer's position is "arguably justified" by terms of col-
lective bargaining agreement); Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1414
(8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing "arguably justified" standard); Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 845 F.2d 1187, 1190 (3d Cir. 1988) (apply-
ing "arguably justified" standard), rev'd on other grounds, 491 U.S. 299 (1989); Local
1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1973) (adopting
"arguablyjustified" standard). The Supreme Court in Conrail eventually ended the
ongoing debate between the circuit courts by also adopting the "arguably justified"
standard. See Conrail 491 U.S. at 311-12 (applying "arguably justified" standard in
determining whether employer's interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
is frivolous).
906 [Vol. 44: p. 895
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minor one, with a "relatively light" burden on management to show that
arbitration is the appropriate forum. 81
With regard to substantive and procedural arbitrability under the
RLA, the courts are not as settled.8 2 Because the RLA does not include
language regarding who has jurisdiction over a determination of the scope
of the agreement, courts have had to turn to National Labor Relations Act
jurisdiction to apply the substantive/procedural analysis to RLA cases.8 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit con-
fronted this issue in Brotherhood Railway, Carmen Division v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Co.84 In that case, the union sued because of an arbi-
tral award given to a discharged employee.8 5 There, the appeals court had
to determine whether the employer had waived his right to contest the
award because it had not introduced its evidence during arbitration.8 6
The court held that the interpretation of the contractual provisions relat-
ing to how the grievances had to be presented was an issue of procedural
arbitrability for the arbitrator to decide.8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also
confronted the problem of classifying major/minor disputes and substan-
tive and procedural arbitrability in the context of labor arbitration.88 For
81. See Stone, supra note 1, at 1510 (discussing presumption in favor of arbi-
trability); see also Atchison, 138 F.3d at 644 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is not hard
for the Railroads to show they fall on the 'interpretation' side of that line.");
United Transp. Union v. South Carolina Pub. Ry., 130 F.3d 627, 632 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting that employer's burden is light); United Transp. Union v. CSX R.R.
Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 591 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing relatively light burden placed
on employer); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Chesapeake W. Ry., 915 F.2d 116,
119 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that Conrail test is "deliberately tilted toward finding a
dispute minor"); Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 869 F.2d 1518,
1522 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (recognizing lighter burden placed on employers); Baylis v.
Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying standard enumerated
in Conrail).
82. See Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155
F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that "substantive arbitrability" doctrine is bor-
rowed from NLRA jurisdiction).
83. See id. (discussing arbitrability analysis in context of RLA).
84. 956 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. See id. at 157-58.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 159.
88. See Bell Atlantic-Pa., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 164 F.3d
197, 200-02 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing major/minor and procedural/substantive
distinction); Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 685, 689-91 (reviewing relationship
between major/minor and procedural/substantive analysis); Teamsters Local 312
v. Matlack, Inc. 118 F.3d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1997) (reviewing "procedural" analysis);
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996)
(discussing court's ability to review arbitrator's decision); McQuestion v. New
Jersey Rail Operations, 30 F.3d 388, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing major/mi-
nor distinction where "de facto" collective bargaining agreement exists); Miklavic
v. USAir, Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 553 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing role of arbitrator versus
role of federal courts); Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d
1999]
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example, in Miklavic v. USAir, Inc.,8 9 the court had to determine whether a
dispute between USAir and its employees constituted a minor dispute
under the RLA.9 0 In Miklavic, despite a collective bargaining agreement
guarantee that fleet service personnel employed by USAir had the right to
purchase life insurance at the same rates charged to non-union personnel,
fleet service personnel were charged a higher rate.9 1 The employees filed
suit in the district court without first filing a grievance.9 2 Because the
Third Circuit found that the dispute was a minor one that could be re-
solved based on the collective bargaining agreement, it dismissed the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.9 3
The major/minor framework can give rise to a substantive/proce-
dural analysis. 94 That is, once it has been determined that a dispute is
minor and concerns the existing collective bargaining agreement, then an
issue may arise as to whether the collective bargaining agreement contem-
plates the arbitration of that issue.95 The dichotomy rests on the distinc-
tion between whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue
disputed (substantive arbitrability) and a mere procedural issue, such as
whether the failure to follow the grievance procedure precludes arbitra-
tion (procedural arbitrability).96 The reason for this distinction lies in the
345, 347-50 (3d Cir. 1992) (comparing role of court and role of arbitrator in
dispute).
Although a number of the cases heard by the Third Circuit pertain to labor
disputes, much of the analysis is also relevant to securities law disputes. See
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1377 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
court/arbitrator jurisdictional issues in securities dispute); PaineWebber, Inc. v.
Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1990) (focusing on arbitrability in con-
text of securities law).
89. 21 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1994).
90. See id. at 552-53.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 558 (recognizing that minor issue was for arbitrator to
determine).
93. See id. at 558.
94. See Independent Ass'n of Continental Airlines v. Continental Airlines, 155
F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that major/minor analysis can be followed by
determination of whether dispute concerns issue of procedural arbitrability or sub-
stantive arbitrability).
95. See id. (defining distinction between substantive arbitrability and proce-
dural arbitrability); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-
57 (1964) (describing procedural versus substantive arbitrability); Larsen v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 313 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1963) (discussing characteristics of
procedural arbitrability).
96. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 692-93 (reviewing reasons behind dis-
tinction); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers of Am. v. Pirelli Arm-
strong Tire Corp., 104 F.3d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that procedural issues
that "grow" out of original disagreement are for arbitrator to decide).
[Vol. 44: p. 895908
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contract nature of arbitration-a party should only be forced to arbitrate
what they have agreed is arbitrable. 97
This issue has arisen in a number of statutory contexts within the
Third Circuit, including securities law and the Federal Arbitration Act.98
In two Third Circuit cases, PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann99 and PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Hofmann,100 the securities brokerage house sued to stop the arbitra-
tion of clients' claims of fraud and mismanagement. 10 1 The court held in
Hartmann, and reiterated in Hofmann, that it had jurisdiction over the dis-
putes because, although the disputes were "minor," in both cases the con-
tract placed a substantive limit on the claims the parties had contracted to
arbitrate. 10 2 Thus, the scope of the arbitration agreement was for the
court, not the arbitrator, to decide.103
The Third Circuit addressed the substantive and procedural arbi-
trability questions under the RLA in Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir,
Inc.10 4 In Association of Flight Attendants, the issue on appeal was whether
the district court erred in ruling that the grievant's expunged criminal
records must be admitted in arbitration. 10 5 The court held that the dis-
pute was neither major nor minor but constituted a question of proce-
dural arbitrability that was for the arbitrator to decide. 10 6
More recently, in Continental Airlines, the Third Circuit analyzed this
issue of substantive versus procedural arbitrability under the RLA.1° 7
There, the court analyzed the relationship between the major/minor
framework and the substantive/procedural analysis and defined "substan-
tive arbitrability" and "procedural arbitrability" in determining whether a
labor dispute could be resolved by the courts.' 0 8
97. See PaineWebber v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[N]o
party should be forced to arbitrate an issue that it did not agree to submit to
arbitration.").
98. See id. at 1381-82 (utilizing substantive arbitrability analysis); see also
PaineWebber v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing
whether determination of scope of arbitration is for courts to decide).
99. 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990).
100. 984 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1993).
101. See Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 509-10 (reviewing facts of case); see also Hof-
mann, 984 F.2d at 1373-74 (discussing parties' claims).
102. See Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1381 (reviewing substantive arbitrability doc-
trine); Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 514 (determining that PaineWebber would "suffer
irreparable harm" if forced to arbitrate dispute).
103. See Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 513 (noting that issues of substantive arbi-
trability are not for arbitrator to decide); see also Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1383 (con-
cluding that "it is the court's obligation to determine the scope of the arbitration
agreement").
104. 960 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1992).
105. See id. at 346-47.
106. See id. at 348-50.
107. See Independent Ass'n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155
F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1998) (reviewing primary issue before court).
108. See id. at 692-94 (recognizing that issues of procedural arbitrability are
for arbitrator and issues of substantive arbitrability are for court).
1999]
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DETERMINATIONS ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT
ASSOCIATION OF CONTINVTAL PILOTS V. COVTINENVTAL
AIRLINES THE ROLE OF THE COURTS OR
THE ARBITRATOR?
A. The Issue, Facts and Procedural Posture
In 1992, after Continental Airlines filed its second petition for protec-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the airline froze pilot pay,
and then tried to reduce it.10 9 In response to the airline's attempt to re-
duce their pay, a group of Continental's pilots undertook negotiations
with Continental's management that resulted in a written agreement enti-
fled "Cost Reduction Memorandum" ("CRM"). 1 10 The CRM included a
provision calling for the phased restoration of any reduction in pilot
pay."' The CRM also provided that, should the airline grant a raise to
any group of employees other than pilots, the pilots would also receive a
comparable pay raise ("me-too" provision).112
Thereafter, Continental and the Independent Association of Conti-
nental Pilots ("IACP") entered into an agreement entitled the "Interim
Grievance Procedure" ("IGP"), which was put into place pending the com-
109. See id. at 687 (discussing how to determine whether arbitrator or court
has jurisdiction over dispute).
110. See id. (discussing negotiations and agreement between management
and union). The Court in Continental Airlines did not address the issue of Conti-
nental's bankruptcy and its original attempt to change the terms of the collective
bargaining unit. See id. at 687 (mentioning Continental's filing for bankruptcy but
not addressing implications of act). There is much debate surrounding the inter-
section of the RLA and bankruptcy laws. See Grab, supra note 2, at 4-5 (arguing
that bankruptcy courts often broaden scope of RLA). Although bankruptcy courts
are equitable in nature, their goals are not always in accordance with the goals of
the RLA. See id. (noting that bankruptcy courts stress "speedy financial rehabilita-
tion of the debtor" while RLA aims to equalize bargaining process between man-
agement and labor). The two areas of law cannot operate separately because, for
airlines in the midst of bankruptcy, labor strife can severely compound their
problems. See id. at 24 (noting that airlines in financial crisis are particularly sus-
ceptible to labor disputes). But see Stone, supra note 1, at 1491-92 ("[Airlines] used
bankruptcy laws to repudiate their collective bargaining agreements.").
111. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 687-88 (describing CRM provisions).
The restoration was to occur according to a mutually agreed upon formula as out-
lined in Paragraph 6(A) of the CRM. See id. The provision reads as follows:
The wage reductions (i.e. Fuel bonus, line divisor, training, per diem,
and crew meals) ... will be restored progressively by Continental, in ac-
cordance with the formula set forth in Attachment A, with full restoration
projected byJuly 1, 1993. As part of the restoration, the program of quar-
terly fuel bonus payments to pilots shall end, and in lieu thereof pilots
rates of pay progressively restored shall be the ... April 1, 1992 rates of
pay.
Id.
112. See id. at 688 (reviewing "me-too" provision). This "me-too" provision
stated: "Should Continental grant a wage or salary increase to any employee group,
including management and executive employees, prior to restoration of pilot wage
reductions, then the company shall at the same time restore pilot wages on a com-
parable basis." Id.
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pletion of the first collective bargaining agreement. 113 The IGP outlined
a two-step procedure for resolving grievances.11 4
On September 9, 1994, after the IGP was implemented, but before
the collective bargaining agreement was in effect, a pilot filed a grievance
calling for Continental to honor the CRM and its provisions relating to the
fuel bonus and the restoration of pilot wage reductions. 1 15 The pilot un-
successfully pursued his grievance through the first two stages of the griev-
ance procedure and then filed an appeal through the System Board. 116
About one month later, the IACP refiled the pilot's appeal in an attempt
to extend the grievance on a class wide basis. 117 Subsequently, Continen-
tal and IACP underwent arbitration. 118 During the course of the arbitra-
tion proceedings, however, the parties disagreed over whether any
determination by the arbitrator concerning the "me-too" provision or the
IACP's right to raise claims for similarly situated pilots would be review-
able de novo by a federal court.119
113. See id. (discussing IGP).
114. See id. (describing grievance procedure). The IGP's provision was made
in accordance with § 204 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 184. See id. (noting
agreement's compliance with statute's requirements). This portion of the Railway
Labor Act is one of the amendments made to the statute in extending its applica-
tion to the airline industry. See id. at n.1. This provision of the Railway Labor Act
declares, "'it shall be the duty of every carrier to and of its employees, acting
through their representatives.., to establish a board of adjustment' .... A 'board
of adjustment' so established is an arbitral tribunal to which the parties may refer
any grievances that are not otherwise resolved." Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 184). As
such, the IGP established a system board of adjustment ("System Board") for arbi-
trating grievances. See id. (noting how System Board was established). The IGP
called for a two step grievance procedure that contemplated two preliminary
stages, "Step 1" and "Step 2" hearings, followed by an "appeal to the system board
of adjustment of any grievance not resolved in the first two stages." Id.
115. See id. (noting basis of pilot's grievance). The pilot, Jackson Martin, filed
a grievance that stated:
The [CRM] establishes that fuel bonus will be restored, it establishes a
protocol for the use of a higher hourly rate in lieu of quarterly fuel bonus
payments and it defines Continental's total liability toward restoration of
pilot wage reductions to April 1, 1992 pay rates plus the value of the fuel
bonus program. Continental Airlines should honor the Agreement it
reached with its pilots under the Cost Reduction Memorandum and fully
restore pilot wage reductions; to not do so would substantially alter the
letter and intent of the current Pilot Employment Policy.
Id.
116. See id. (noting unsuccessful pursuance of grievances).
117. See id. The pilot Martin filed his initial appeal to the System Board on
January 4, 1995. See id. The IACP refiled the appeal on February 8, 1995. See id.
The IACP's appeal denoted the issue as "whether [Continental] is in violation of
the [CRMI . . . and all related provisions for failure to properly enact pilot pay
restoration rate effective July 1, 1994." Id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 688. Prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceeding,
Continental took the position that the IACP could not bring the appeal on behalf
of the pilots as a class and that the System Board could not decide on the merits of
any claim brought under the "me-too" provision of the CRM because Martin had
1999]
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The IACP, in its complaint, sought an order declaring that Continen-
tal Airlines was required to arbitrate the issue of whether or not the com-
pany violated the "me too" provision and compelling Continental to
resolve this issue on a class-wide basis:' 20 Continental moved for judg-
ment on the pleadings, urging the district court that the IACP sought judi-
cial determination of issues that should properly be decided by the System
Board as part of the arbitration proceedings. 121 The district court granted
Continental's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the
case.
122
B. The Third Circuit Draws a Line: An Analysis of the Major/Minor and
Procedural/Substantive Arbitrability Distinctions
On appeal, the main issue before the Third Circuit was the allocation
of authority between the courts and the arbitrators under the RLA. 123
The district court had framed the issue as whether the dispute was "major"
or "minor."1 24 Finding the dispute in question was "minor," the district
court granted Continental's request for judgment on the pleadings. 12 5
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, but for two differ-
ent reasons. 126 Although the Third Circuit agreed that the issue was a
.minor" dispute under the RLA, it found that, given the facts of the case,
an analysis of whether the issue pertained to procedural arbitrability or
substantive arbitrability would be determinative. 127
1. The Major/Minor Distinction
Applying the major/minor analysis to the facts of Continental, the
Third Circuit noted with emphasis that there was "no doubt" that the ques-
not invoked the "me too" provision during the early stages of the grievance proce-
dure. See id. Once arbitration began, the IACP announced its intention not to
proceed unless Continental would agree that any arbitrator determinations on
both of the above-mentioned issues would be reviewable de novo by a federal
court. See id. Continental refused and the arbitrator ended the proceedings. See
id. at 688-89 (noting Continental's position and outcome).
120. See id. at 689.
121. See id. Continental petitioned that the issues the IACP presented to the
court, the class-wide based appeal and Continental's alleged violation of the "me
too" provision of the CRM, were issues to be decided by the arbitrator. See id. To
counter Continental's motion, the union took the position that these were issues
of "substantive arbitrability" that the court should decide before arbitration. See id.
(discussing interpretation of issues presented to court).
122. See id. (discussing district court's decision).
123. See id. at 687 (discussing broad issue under appeal) (citing Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151).
124. See id. at 689-91 (reviewing major/minor distinctions as well as proce-
dural/substantive delineations).
125. See id. at 692 (discussing main issue on appeal).
126. See id. at 692-93 (noting district court's holding).
127. See id. (recognizing that dispute would be characterized as "minor" but
that does not end analysis).
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don whether Continental violated the CRM "me-too" provision was a mi-
nor dispute that gave exclusive jurisdiction to the arbitrator. 128 In
reaching this decision, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent in
Burley and Conrai as well as its own precedent, and focused on the fact
that the issues in contention related back to existing agreements between
the IACP and Continental. 129 The court went on to explain, however, that
the court would have to examine whether, by broadening the scope of
Martin's claim, the IACP introduced additional and "antecedent" issues
that must be determined judicially before arbitration, or whether the is-
sues themselves were subject to arbitration.13 0 Thus, while the court af-
firmed the district court's findings that the dispute was a "minor" dispute
under the RLA, the court stated that one question still needed to be ad-
dressed-whether the issues presented in Continental Airlines concerned
questions of procedural or substantive arbitrability.1
3 1
2. Procedural and Substantive Arbitrability: Who Determines the Scope?
Next the Third Circuit examined the "related" question of whether
this "minor" dispute could be characterized as a question of "procedural
arbitrability" or "substantive arbitrability."1 3 2 The court noted that, while
the major/minor analysis decides the allocation of authority between the
arbitration board and the judiciary, the procedural/substantive question
addresses the scope of the arbitration and who should decide that
scope. 13 3
128. See id. at 693 (noting that question presented involved determination of
scope of agreement).
129. See id. at 690-92 (affirming district court's determination that underlying
dispute was minor and involved question of interpretation).
130. See id. at 692 (relying on Supreme Court precedent in justifying its
position).
i31. See id. at 693 (discussing fact that determination characterizing dispute
as minor did not end analysis). The court points out that "[t]he major/minor
question allocates the respective authority of the National Mediation Board on one
hand, and the arbitral boards of adjustment on the other, and also delineates the
judiciary's role in each respective statutory path." Id.
132. See id. (discussing how to proceed in analyzing facts of case).
133. See id. (reviewing how major/minor analysis fits in with procedural/sub-
stantive determination). The court noted that the procedural/substantive issue is
related to but different from than the major/minor issue. See id. Although a determi-
nation that a dispute is minor may mean it is an arbitrable dispute, the scope of
that dispute could be either for the court to decide (substantive arbitrability) or
for the arbitrator to decide (procedural arbitrability). See id. at 693-94. Part of the
rationale behind this distinction seems to come from the policy concern that arbi-
tration is a creature of contract and, as such, parties should not have to arbitrate
issues outside of those they have agreed upon. See Bell Atiantic-Pa. v. Communica-
tions Workers of Am., 164 F.3d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing procedural
versus substantive arbitrability); Teamsters v. Matlack, 118 F.3d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir.
1997) (discussing reasons why substantive arbitrability issues are for courts to de-
termine); Miklavic v. USAir, Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 553-56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
substantive arbitrability issues fall under court's jurisdiction); Association of Flight
1999]
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In Continental Airlines, the Third Circuit noted the union's argument
that the IGP presented exhaustion principles that put the dispute outside
of the parties' agreement and thus outside of the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion.' 3 4 The IACP argued that the issues were of substantive arbitrability,
and thus for the court to decide. 135 The court rejected the union's argu-
ment and found that the dispute arose under the context of the agree-
ment.136 Furthermore, the court pointed out that a determination of the
issue would require a determination on the merits of the dispute itself-a
determination that falls in the purview of the arbitrator. l3 7
In addressing whether the issues involved substantive or procedural
arbitrability, the court noted that the distinction does not come from the
RIA itself.'3 8 The court justified its use of this framework by citing to the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Atchison as well as the Third Circuit's decision
Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing substan-
tive analysis).
134. See ContinentalAirlines, 155 F.3d at 693 (noting that "[t]he function that a
court performs when determining whether a dispute is major or minor is not the
function that a court performs when deciding whether an issue is one of 'substan-
tive arbitrability' or 'procedural arbitrability' ").
135. See id. at 694 (discussing IACP's contention that substantive bar to arbi-
tration exists due to exhaustion provisions). The "exhaustion" provisions referred
to by IACP states, "The System Board shall have authority to hear only matters
which are within the scope of this Agreement and which have been handled
through the prior steps of this grievance procedure." Id. Thus, the issue over
whether Martin's claims relevant to the "me too" provision, which he did not bring
up early in the grievance process, IACP argued, would be outside of the Agree-
ment and so outside the arbitrator's authority. See id.
The court, however, pointed to another provision in the Agreement that
stated:
Unless the Company and the grieving or the IACP mutually agree other-
wise, a grieving is precluded from raising in subsequent steps issues not
raised in his original grievance. Further, the Step II Hearing Officer and
System Board of Adjustment are precluded from considering issues not
raised in the grievance's original grievance unless the Company and tlfe
grievant or the IACP mutually agree otherwise. Such issues may only be
submitted as new grievances subject to all time limits, jurisdictional re-
strictions, and any other pertinent provisions of this Agreement.
Id.
The court found that such provisions did not represent a substantive bar to
arbitrability and, even if the exhaustion provisions rose to an important level, pub-
lic policy in support of arbitration as the forum of choice in resolution of labor
disputes would favor the arbitrator as the forum over the court. See id. at 694. For
a further discussion of the court's analysis of whether or not "exhaustion princi-
ples" were present, see infra notes 137-153 and accompanying text.
136. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 695 (reviewing IACP's argument).
137. See id. (discussing position that terms of agreement do not place substan-
tive bar to arbitration).
138. See id. at 696 (discussing IACP's second contention-that expansion of
grievance class-wide presented substantive bar to arbitration). The court focused
separately on the two issues presented by the IACP. See id. at 695-96. The court
noted that the second issue, "whether the arbitrator must entertain the Martin
grievance on behalf of all pilots," required some investigation into the meaning of
the agreements. Id. at 696. The court reasoned that an arbitrator might find the
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in Association of Flight Attendants, both of which held the procedural arbi-
trability doctrine to be applicable under the RLA.139 The Court also re-
lied on the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley. 140 John Wiley did not
arise under the RLA context, but under the context of the NLRA. 141 The
Third Circuit reasoned that in John Wiley the issue at hand was the failure
of the grievant, a union member, to exhaust the grievance procedures out-
lined in the collective bargaining agreement. 142 Likewise, that was an is-
sue between the IACP and Continental. 43 Thus, relying on Supreme
Court precedent utilizing the procedural arbitrability doctrine as well as its
own and the Seventh Circuit's precedent, the Third Circuit determined
that the procedural arbitrability analysis was applicable to the case at
bar.' 44
A more problematic challenge was raised by the IACP. 14 5 The IACP
argued that the exhaustion requirement of the IGP presented a substan-
tive bar to arbitration under the court's prior rulings in Hartmann and
Hofmann.146 The IACP contended that, under these two cases, language
in the agreement that limits the circumstances under which a dispute can
be arbitrated presents a question of substantive arbitrability. 147 The IACP
relied on language found in the arbitration provisions in Hartmann and
Hofmann that read, "[n]o dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible
for submission to arbitration . . .where six (6) years have elapsed." 148
The IACP presented language from the IGP that stated in part, "Un-
less the company and the grievant or the IACP mutually agree otherwise, a
grievant is precluded from raising in subsequent steps issues not raised in
language of the relevant CRM provision to permit or mandate "class-wide relief."
Id.
139. See id. at 695 & n.8.
140. See id. (stating that procedural arbitrability doctrine "has been held ap-
plicable to RLA cases by other courts of appeals as well"); see also Association of
Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing
issue under RLA as one of procedural arbitrability); Brotherhood of Ry., Carmen
Div. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 956 F.2d 156, 159-61 (7th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing procedural arbitrability doctrine under RLA).
141. SeeJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 544 (1964) (dis-
cussing applicability of Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley to facts presented in
Continental Airlines.
142. See id. at 557-58 (noting that, in dispute brought under NLRA, subject
matter of dispute must be within scope of arbitration agreement).
143. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 692-95 (comparing facts in John Wiley
to those in case at bar).
144. See id. at 695 (discussing facts of case).
145. See id. at 693 (determining whether procedural arbitrability doctrine is
applicable under RLA).
146. See id. (noting IACP's reliance on Third Circuit cases arising under se-
curities laws).
147. See id. at 693-94 (discussing IACP's reliance on prior cases) (citing
PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993) and PaineWebber v. Hart-
mann, 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990)).
148. Id. at 693.
1999] 915
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his original grievance." 149 The LACP urged the court that this language,
like the language in the arbitration agreements in Hartmann and Hofmann,
presented a substantive bar to arbitration. 150
The court rejected this argument and held that the issues presented a
question of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator to decide.1 51 The
court reasoned that its holdings in Hartmann and Hofmann were narrowly
tailored and that "[11anguage less distinct than 'eligible for submission to
arbitration' might well be insufficient to overcome the strong jurispruden-
tial pull towards arbitration." 152 The court went on to note that, even if
the language in the IGP passed the standard laid out in Hartmann and
Hoffman, the public policy favoring arbitration in labor disputes would still
relegate the dispute to the arbitral setting.153
3. A Note for Practitioner
The Third Circuit's decision in Continental Airlines underscores the
court's deference for arbitration in labor disputes.1 54 Although Continen-
tal Airlines does not, represent the first time the court was faced with a
substantive arbitrability question under the RLA, the holding does clarify
the factors examined in making a jurisdictional determination. 15 5 The
court was clear that a mere characterization of a dispute as major or minor
will not end the analysis in all cases because the court will borrow from
NLRA law. 156 Furthermore, in determining whether a collective bargain-
ing agreement presents an exhaustion provision that would place a sub-
stantive bar to arbitration, the court will narrowly construe the language of
149. Id. at 694.
150. See id.
151. See id. (noting IACP's argument). The IACP's contention was that, by
not including the "me too" provision in the first steps of the grievance process set
forth in the CRM, a determination of whether it is an arbitrable issue lies outside
of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. See id.
152. Id. at 697.
153. See id. at 694 (discussing public policy behind arbitration).
154. See id. at 696-97 ("In the collective bargaining setting, the primacy of the
arbitral role is crucial to the stability of the work place."). The Third Circuit's
policy emphasis were clearly different in Continental Airlines as compared to Hof-
mann and Hartmann. Compare Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 696-97 (emphasizing
importance of arbitration in labor context), with PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann,
984 F.2d 1372, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting policy in favor of freedom of contract),
and PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1990) (discuss-
ing appropriate standard of review in contract cases).
155. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 696-97 (discussing importance of arbi-
tration in labor disputes). The Third Circuit seemed to focus on the industry ex-
pertise of the arbitrator as well as the efficiency of arbitration procedures as factors
in their determination. See id. (noting that "[e]xcessive judicial intrusion can un-
dermine arbitral expertise and authority.., lengthy court proceedings can seri-
ously undermine the capacity for prompt adjudication which is the hallmark of
adjudication").
156. See Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d
Cir. 1992) (discussing procedural arbitrability doctrine under RLA).
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the agreement in the labor context.157 Where the language of an agree-
ment is ambiguous and is merely "framed in obligatory terms," the court
will not necessarily interpret the provision as a "substantive bar" to
arbitration. 1
58
In addition, in Continental Airlines, the Third Circuit underscored its
position that labor arbitration deserves particular deference in accordance
with Supreme Court precedent and the intent behind the RLA.159 Thus,
the holding in Continental Airlines is closely tied to the facts and parties
involved. 160 Indeed, the court made it clear, by differentiating the securi-
ties context of Hartmann and Hofmann from the airline labor context in
Continental Airlines, that policy was a strong factor in the decision.1 61
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, there is little doubt that the airline industry is in trouble. 162
Plagued by financial strain and labor strife, the industry is in constant
flux. 165 As such, the Third Circuit's decision in Continental Airlines ap-
pears to be in keeping with a public policy that recognizes the special con-
cerns of this precarious industry.16 4 The Third Circuit's holding and
rationale in Continental Airlines underscore public policy that favors arbi-
tration in labor disputes.1 65 The court's decision solidifies the need for
157. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 696 (discussing policy in favor of arbi-
tration in labor cases).
158. See id. ("When a court is called upon to determine whether aspects of a
dispute arising out of a collective bargaining agreement are to be determined by
an arbitrator or by the court, judicial restraint is an institutional imperative.").
159. See id. at 694 (discussing judicial deference toward arbitration).
160. See id. at 696-97 (recognizing importance of labor arbitration); see also
Bell Atlantic-Pa., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 164 F.3d 197, 203 (3d
Cir. 1999) (discussing procedural arbitrability doctrine and finding that dispute
presented issue for arbitrator to decide).
161. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 696-97 (noting that, at least partly
because issue arose in labor context, language did not present "substantive bar" to
arbitration); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 1496 (discussing presumption in favor
of arbitrability in labor disputes arising under RLA).
162. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 694-95.
163. See Beth S. Adler, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial
Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 NW. U. L. Rv. 1003, 1005 (1986) (noting
changes in airlines since deregulation took effect); Grab, supra note 2, at 24 (stat-
ing "airlines encounter turbulent financial conditions"); Jochner, supra note 2, at
220 (recognizing threat that excessive debt poses to airline industry). For a further
discussion on the airline industry's financial problems, see supra notes 2-3 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion about the interaction of bankruptcy laws and
the RLA, see supra note 110.
164. See Grab, supra note 2, at 2 (recognizing that labor strife plays important
role in airlines' problems); Schuler, supra note 1, at 189 (noting problems in air-
line industry). For further discussion about the impact of the airline industry's
labor strife on its financial problems, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
165. See Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 694 (emphasizing importance of sta-
bility in labor arena); Adler, supra note 163, at 1004 (recounting problems associ-
ated with airline industry); Grab, supra note 2, at 1-2 (noting public's perception of
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precise language in collective bargaining agreements because, when ambi-
guity presents itself, 'judicial restraint is an institutional imperative." 166
Wendy A. Tyson
airlines as "a troubled institution"); Stone, supra note 1, at 1495 (discussing public
policy behind labor regulation).
166. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d at 696; see Bell Atlantic-Pa. v. Communica-
tions Workers of Am., 164 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing public policy
favoring arbitration in collective baragaining cases); Stone, supra note 1, at 1495
(recognizing that courts' standards for defining jurisdiction have placed strain on
unions).
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